No. 597
FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Berlin # 688.
http://ljsheehan.livejournal.com
Will you please transmit the following message from former Minister MATSUOKA to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP:
"Now that I have resigned, I wish to thank Your Excellency for the encouragement you gave me while I was still in office. I assure you that you will see no change in the Imperial Government's foreign policy because of my resignation. Will you please so inform Chancellor HITLER and give him my best regards."Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Trans. 7-26-41
No. 598
FROM: Tokyo July 28, 1941
TO: Berlin # 700.
Strictly Secret.
(Request Message).
From the Chief of the Exchange Bureau to Finance Official YUMOTO.
On the 27th the following decision was reached in a Cabinet meeting concerning retaliatory measures against the United States for bringing into play an order freezing Japanese money. The measures which will be taken on the basis thereof will be to freeze the financial assets of Americans and to limit their dealings. The ordinance upon which the Treasury Department will rely, based on the law governing the control of foreign exchange, is outlined in my separate # 701 [a]. This ordinance was promulgated today, the 28th, to meet the action of the United States in freezing Japanese assets. Be it noted:
In case the United States actuates an order freezing Japanese assets, Japan likewise in answer thereto will take measures of revenge, based upon the law for the control of foreign exchange and will curtail all the dealings of citizens of the United States. However, if in applying the order the United States chooses to deal leniently with us, we will answer in kind. We will have Manchukuo and China take the same measures as are taken in Japan.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 7-30-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 599
FROM: Berlin July 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 913.
Re your message # 661 [a]. The following is a retransmission.
# 906. At Koenigsburg, on the night of the 14th.
This morning I flew to the general headquarters and was received first by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and then by Dictator Hitler. We conversed for a period of over five hours, during which time we exchanged opinions in a straightforward manner .
As you are aware, Hitler is a very idealistic person. When he urged Japanese cooperation with Germany, he showed no indications of asking for it for the purpose of benefiting Germany alone. Instead, he pointed out that in the long run, the United States and the Soviet Union are the foes of Germany and Japan jointly. With this consideration, he urged that Japan clearly express its attitude with the Tripartite Pact as its basis. I could clearly see that the Fuehrer was not at all satisfied with Japan's attitude, particularly with regard to the continuation of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations.
I am convinced that he made his suggestions in the interests of Japan, because, as I mentioned before, he is a highly idealistic person. If we proceed in the present manner, I feel certain that it would be the equivalent of removing the back bone from the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, regardless of how strongly we try to make use of the Tripartite Pact at the conclusion of the present European war, it would be all in vain.
I do not believe that I am cowering under German intimidations. It is one thing if we do not intend to look upon the Tripartite Pact with any importance. However, if we intend to make the Tripartite Pact the foundation of all of our foreign policy I feel that there is considerable room for reflection. I am convinced that I neither lie nor exaggerate and I am willing to assume full responsibility for my conviction. Please believe me and trust me.
Trans. 7-18-41
No. 600
FROM: Berlin July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 969.
Re your Circular # 1642. [a]
1. I fear that your opinion regarding Germany's plans and objectives in the Russo-German war does not touch on the real motives and that there is danger of misunderstanding in regard to these. Please make special reference to my telegrams # 413 [a], 418 [a], 456 [a], 619 [a], 638 [a], 639 [a], 669 [a], 716 [a], etc.
2. As I understand it, in your opinion, Germany recognizes that effecting a landing in England would be difficult and so is preparing for a long war. But according to my opinion, while it is true that Germany is making preparations for a long war, still I believe that Germany as heretofore is planning to bring matters to a conclusion in a short war. Please inform me as to the basis for your opinion.
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3. That the Soviet should plan a guerrilla war was only natural, however I think that it will be very difficult for Russia to exhaust the German army, which has an excess of mechanized divisions and aerial strength, by such tactics.
4. Not to expect the immediate collapse of the Stalin regime is to reach a hasty conclusion. Even during the existence of the Stalin regime the amount of actual administrative power exercised by it is a problem deserving close study. (This is closely related to investigations being carried on by the Japanese government in the Orient.) I wish to be informed of your expectations regarding the probable course of the Stalin regime after the destruction of the Soviet army in Europe(?).
5. That America will go to war one day is axiomatic. The problem is not whether or not America will go to war on the basis of international law, but just to what extent America has the power and facilities to extend aid to Britain. I would like to know concretely just what your prognostications in regard to this are.
[a] 1642: dated 29 July; 413: Not available; 418, 456, 457, 619, 638, 639, 669, 716, not translated.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Trans. 8-6-41
No. 601
FROM: Berlin May 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 541.
The same gentleman whom I quoted in my # 540 [a] told me confidentially the following with regard to the general European question:
"1. CHANCELLOR HITLER had conversations with DARLAN in Berchtesgaden which were conducted in a most amiable atmosphere. HITLER was well impressed by DARLAN. I do not know but what in the future policies with regard to France will center around DARLAN rather than LAVAL. The France-German talks covered the use of French colonies as German military bases and the use of the French Navy for convoying French shipping. Syria is a great problem but in the event of American participation in the war Dakar will assume a much greater importance. (According to a special report, it is rumored that already German troops have landed even in Algeria.) WEYGAND, too, is aware of this. This, of course, is an unofficial report but on the surface at least there is nothing to contradict it.
"2. The Soviet unchangingly has been faithfully carrying out her supply of goods. Furthermore, in certain quarters she has withdrawn her troops from the border but whether this is in anticipation of war or with the intention of avoiding war, is not clear. The preparations of the German authorities are progressing on schedule but in truth the decision as to whether war will arise rests entirely with no man other than CHANCELLOR HITLER. However, it is a fact that it is being said that the German Army is confident that within a few weeks it would be able to carry European Russia before it.
"3. The transportation of arms and munitions to Iraq is scheduled to begin soon with the tacit consent of Turkey. It is thought that the air arm, too, will within a very few days arrive on the spot. In the event that Turkey's attitude becomes none too pleasing, I do not know but what Syria might be offered to her .
"4. Germany has decided that Italy shall have domination over the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the is as I have told you previously and in the future Egypt too will comehttp://ljsheehan.livejournal.com
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under the Italian sphere of influence. At the same time that Germany on the one hand grants Italy a sphere of influence over the eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand she is restraining demands upon the French which already are making for joint German-French collaboration."
[a] The person to whom this message refers is spoken of in message # 540 as "a certain authoritative German." See II, 519.
Trans. 5-14-41
No. 602
FROM: Tokyo May 20, 1941
TO: Berne # 4
With reference to your regular communication # 484, please report if there is any activity concerning the exchange of materials through Soviet Russia in respect to German commerce.
Trans. 5-23-41
No. 603
FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 76 Commerce.
Regarding your (commerce circular # 1049).
Hiruga stated confidentially to Miyakawa as follows:
"When the Economic Agreement (with Germany) was entered into on September 28, 1939, U.S.S.R. invited Germany to transport goods through U.S.S.R. as much as she please and made absolutely no other commitments. At that time, there was no talk about what should be done about war materials, which indeed was very unfortunate. We have in previous times prohibited the importation and transportation of war materials, but regarding the present restrictions we have received inquiries from Berlin. However, excepting the item list 4, we have done nothing more than to draw up more detailed list. The item list 4 is a new list, and because of its importance I have asked MIKOYAN about it. According to him, all the machine tools and other machinery on the prohibition list are of special type which can be used for making arms, bombs and planes. Therefore, we informed Berlin to that effect and are awaiting instructions."
When Miyakawa asked whether an exception can't be made in this particular case, Hiruga replied that he had nothing to say on that point.
Trans. 5-19-41
A-309
No. 604
FROM: Tokyo May 19, 1941
TO: Berlin # 419.
Re your #535 [a].
Obtain German opinion of the following points:
(1) Since U.S.S.R. will not accept transit goods consigned to destinations other than those countries which have a transit agreement with Russia, have goods so consigned shipped as if to Germany which will then forward.
(2) Pay freight in free German marks for goods shipped through occupied territory.
Trans. 6-20-41
No. 605
FROM: Tokyo May 22, 1941
TO: Berne # 47.
On March 17th, there was published a Soviet-Swiss commercial pact and it would appear that there was appended thereto a clause concerning the transit of Swiss goods through the Soviet. On March 12th, the Soviet issued an order to forestall the transit through Russia of the goods mentioned in my # 48 [a] and # 49 [a]. It looks as though this was designed to keep us from getting military machines and pertinent manufacturing tools. We are now conferring about this and would like to know whether or not it is true that the Soviet is contriving to keep us from procuring arms and machinery from Switzerland by land routes. Please conduct a private investigation and wire me back as soon as possible.
Trans. 5-24-41
No. 606
FROM: Berlin June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 654.
To Chief of Commerce Bureau from Matusima.
With German and Soviet relations becoming increasingly bad, it will soon be impossible to import goods from Germany via Siberia.http://ljsheehan.livejournal.com
Trans. 6-9-41
A-310
No. 607
FROM: Berlin June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 712.
I have been for some time informing the German Government of our desire that trade be opened between the unoccupied territories and Japan. To this, that government has replied by inquiring what we think of its suggestion that we add to the terms of the recently concluded Japan-Soviet Trade Pact others which would make possible transit of goods through Soviet territories to and from Third-Power countries (including the unoccupied territories) in addition to Germany.
Will you please inform me whether such terms have been included?
No. 608
FROM: Hsinking June 17, 1941
TO: Moscow # 64.
Action Tokyo as # 339.
Regarding my # 236, Paragraph (2): [a]
No formal arrangement with the Soviet is necessary to reopen courier service between Manchukuo and Europe except the requirement of visas. Hereafter, we wish to send couriers, on the average of once in two months. Komura and Ōki will be sent according to the following schedule:
23 June, leave Manchuli; 29 June, Moscow; 1 July, arrive Berlin; 7 July, arrive Rome.
On return trip they will stay one or two days in Moscow.
Trans. 6-19-41
No. 609
FROM: Moscow May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 586.
(Abstract)
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Japanese Ambassador requested Molotov to explain the rumor that war threatens between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, as should such a war take place, Japan will be placed in an embarrassing situation as she is a party to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time is a party to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The only course for her, in such an eventuality, would be to act as a mediator. Molotov assured the Japanese Ambassador that the rumor is without foundation and it was designed to discredit the Tripartite Pact.