Re your #890[a].
Please (make sure ?) immediately and suitably the following points:
1. Since the United States Government wishes to get our explanations regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese-American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of actually opening the negotiations. As to the details of these fundamentals, we have already exchanged our view and so they should be clear. Now that only those points which the United States Government has pointed out remain difficult of agreement (namely, economic activity in the Pacific; withdrawal as well as stationing of troops, and the question of the Three-Power agreement,) would it be all right for us to assume that the United States Government has a clear comprehension of the other points?
2. Now, as to the approval the Premier has given to the four basic principles, he has merely approved of them in principle. In other words, although in principle he considers them good, there may be differences of opinion when it comes to actually applying these four principles. The Premier stated that he would like to consider these differences at the time of the negotiations. In fact, it is on the presumption of doing so that we have been managing affairs domestically. Since this matter is of a delicate nature in its bearing upon the internal situation, I would like to have you see to it that the United States Government has no misunderstanding of it. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[a] See III, 228-239—Text of American Government's statement to the Japanese Government.
Trans. 10-6-41
(Part 1 of 2.)[a]
The tremendous efforts you have been making and the profound concern you have had to have since your appointment are beyond my imagination. I am deeply impressed. It is, indeed, regrettable that things do not turn out as we want them to. Yesterday I expressed myself quite carelessly on the spur of the moment. Please be so kind as to understand that it was the result of no other than a profound concern for my country at this critical moment that caused me to do so.
If I may express my views, I believe that before Japan will be able to become self-sufficient as a result of establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity, economic reorganization of an extremely drastic nature would have to be made. I imagine in actuality we shall find this far
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from easy. I do not know to what extent we shall be able to solve this-----in case we advance northward, but I suppose that if we advance southward we might be able to gain a profitable foothold after several years.
[a] Part 2 of 2 not available.
Re my #637[a]
We are not as yet in receipt of your message. We would appreciate your submitting it to them and advising us of the result at all possible speed.
As you are fully aware, the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the captioned message are of the utmost importance in which every second counts. Without the above information we are unable to continue with our consideration of the U.S. memo. That is the situation here. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[a] See III, 245.
Trans. 10-7-41
Re my #637[a].
Until I receive the explanation to the text of my telegram we cannot go with our discussions on the basis of the American memorandum. Furthermore, the internal situation here is such that it would not permit further delay. Will you therefore reply at once.
Trans. 10-8-41
(In 3 parts—complete.)
I requested the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 7th, and he complied. The following is the gist of our conversation, and I forward it to you for your information only.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
"I am in receipt of the U.S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo) have also received notification thereof from your home government. I would consider myself exceedingly fortunate if I were permitted to hear your opinions thereon", I said.
To this the Ambassador replied that he had received a resume of that memo from Washington, but that was all for that reason he said he had no way of expressing his opinion. I, therefore, said that since the resume undoubtedly limited itself to the listing of all of the more important points, it should facilitate the forming of an opinion. I added that I was striving to reach an understanding through cooperation, in the same manner as is the Ambassador not so much as a diplomat, but rather as a human being. From that viewpoint, what are the views of the U.S. Ambassador, I asked of him, and also asked him if he had not had some communication from his home government which would tend to explain or express opinions on the above mentioned resume.
The Ambassador said he had been cabled the resume only, and nothing more. Without seeing the entire memo, he said, he could not ascertain the tone thereof. He would be very happy if he could be permitted to read the full text, he said. Should, however, he be forced to express an opinion with his inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, he would be inclined to believe that the United States is trying to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.
I, therefore, replied that putting things bluntly, from the viewpoint of the sincere efforts we were making in this matter, we were not completely satisfied with the U.S. note referred to at present.
Part 2
By the above I do not imply that we do not trust the sincerity of the United States, I explained, but say so after taking into consideration the domestic and external circumstances of Japan.
The Ambassador then advised me that even as recently as on the 5th, he wrote up a fourteen page, 3000 word report of the various conditions in Japan based on what he had actually seen and heard himself during his many years of service in Japan. In it, he said that he fully described the real efforts that were being made by us in this matter. However, he did not dwell on this phase of the matter.
2. According to the U.S. memorandum of the 2nd, I continued, the Prime Minister of Japan allegedly stated that he "fully subscribed" to the Four Principles referred to during his conversations with the U.S. Ambassador on the 6th of last month. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The record of the meeting, however, shows that the Premier stated that he was in accord with them only in principle. To this the Ambassador replied that being fully aware of the importance of every word of that interview, he had reported it absolutely accurately to his home government. I, therefore, said that it was because I agreed with him as to the importance of the matter that I wished to make this point clear. Our notes of the meeting clearly record that we agreed in principle only. The copies of the U.S. memorandum which were sent to various persons concerned for their perusal and study were corrected from "fully" to "in principle" so as to coincide with the original. We have already requested the Ambassador in the United States, I continued, to notify the United States of this correction. I am reporting this matter to His Excellency, I said, because I felt that he was concerned. The only reason we mentioned this matter to Ambassador Nomura was because this memorandum had been handed to him for delivery. There was absolutely no other motive in doing so, I said.
The U.S. Ambassador seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with my explanation and expressed his thanks for reporting it to him.
Part 3
Continuing, I said that though I had no intention of being too argumentative, there was one item I would like to question the Ambassador about. I pointed out that in doing so, I did not want the friendly relations between himself and myself to be altered in any manner.
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After thus prefacing my remarks, I said that fundamentally speaking the Prime Minister's message was a private message addressed to a private party. How, then, I lightly pressed, was it that passages therefrom could be quoted in the memorandum which is an official note?
The Ambassador replied that he could see our point clearly and added that it must have been due to faulty handling of the various papers in the State Department. He said that that was entirely an on-the-spot assumption on his part. He went on to say that he would now be able to definitely state that the Prime Minister was in accord "in principle".
3. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, the Ambassador started to say that he seemed to recall that when that matter was first brought up, Ambassador Nomura had accepted the "Four Principles" unconditionally. I, therefore, said that if there is some misunderstanding on the part of the United States through erroneous handling of some papers by our representative, it may become necessary to correct it at some future date. To attempt to do so now, though, I said involves the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. (I referred to "Ambassador Nomura's draft incident of 4 September as an example) and for this reason, I said that I thought it would be better if nothing were done about it at present.
Trans. 10-11-41
Message to Berlin #873 Part 1 of 4.
Re my #708[a].
1. The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my afore mentioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however a rupture caused by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetration of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire But England and the United States brought to bear against us measures equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a protracted struggle The fight between the Reich and the Soviet Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we must make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed.
[a] See II, 204 giving the statement of the policy and views of the Imperial Government.
Trans. 10-8-4]
[A-142]
Message to Berlin #673. Part 2 of 4.
All the while England and the United States were strengthening their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino-Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to terminate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the way for a compromise in our relations with the United States.
2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the Chinese trouble; to win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp; to have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.
Message to Berlin #873. Part 3 of 4.
At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she would even do all she could to improve relations between the two countries (this was during the MATSUOKA STAHMER talks). Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United States from entering the war.
3. The objective of the Japan-German-Italian Three Power Pact was to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. It is further felt that this coincides with the spirit of the Three Power Pact.
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Message to Berlin #873. Part 4 of 4.
4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respective Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We got our latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through a basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG regime, to establish an area to co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) This is for your private information.
Relayed to Washington.
(Part 1 of 4)
(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret) Re your #637[a].
I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:
(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.
[a] See III, 245 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U.S. Government two points.
Trans. 10-10-41
[A-144]
(Part 2 of 4) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)
Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.