41. The German Government Makes Demands on Japan
As Tokyo had informed Ambassador Nomura over a month ago the German government was demanding that Japan force the United States to cease its action against the Axis powers. Unless some definite measures were taken, Berlin warned, the German government would be
[137] IV, 79.
[138] "Memorandum of a Conversation"‑Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, November‑10, 1941, S.D. II, 719.
[139] Ibid.
[140] It should be noted that the New York Times announced the approach of a diplomatic crisis (November 11, 1941, 1:13), warning the American public that the Japanese were expected to strike in early December (November 12, 1941, 7:1, 4).
[141] IV, 80.
31
forced to convoke the Tripartite Pact, thus ending any negotiations between Japan and the United States. [142]
Since the time of that first message from Berlin, the Japanese government had received two additional demands from the German government. However, Foreign Minister Togo had attempted to convince the German Ambassador on November 6, 1941 that Japan would be more likely to convince the United States that it should cease action against Germany after Japanese‑American negotiations had been brought to a successful conclusion. 143
42. Foreign Minister Togo Confers with Ambassador Craigie (November 11, 1941)
Although Ambassador Craigie had called upon Foreign Minister Togo to discuss other business, the representative of the two countries turned the conversation to the subject of Japanese‑American negotiations. Ambassador Craigie stated that the British government was not aware of the full details of those conversations under way in Washington. However, since the success of those negotiations would affect British interests in the Far East, the English government was naturally interested in their success. Once the United States and Japan had reached an agreement on the basic principles for peace and the two countries were ready for real negotiations, Great Britain wished to enter into an agreement with both the United States and Japan. [144]
In reply Foreign Minister Togo stated that the matters under discussion between his government and the United States greatly affected England. It was the Japanese government's desire that Great Britain enter into an agreement with both the United States and Japan at an appropriate time. Although not fully informed on the progress already made during these informal conversations, Ambassador Craigie said he assumed negotiations were still in the preliminary stages. By way of refuting this assumption Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that the Japanese had already handed the United States government its final proposal in an effort to bring the negotiations to a speedy close. [145] At this point in the conversation Foreign Minister Togo took the opportunity to refer to a speech made by Prime Minister Churchill in which he issued a warning to Japan. [146] Since the British Prime Minister had stated in the same speech that he knew nothing of the developments of the Japanese‑American negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo suggested that in the future British statesmen find a basis for their remarks and not issue unfounded threats capable of forming a breach in Japanese‑British diplomacy.
Turning the conversation back to the latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Togo said that if the United States found them in accord with its own basic principles, an agreement could be reached within ten days. If, on the other hand, the United States refused to accept Japan's terms, all negotiations would cease. In view of the fact that there were factions within Japan itself working against the re‑establishment of Japanese‑American and Japanese‑British relations, Foreign Minister Togo felt it necessary to conclude an understanding without delay. Since the Japanese government had made the maximum concessions to date, only the attitude of Great Britain and the United States would stand in the way of peace. From Ambassador Craigie's general attitude Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the British representative
[142] IV, 277.
[143] IV, 81.
[144] IV, 82.
[145] Ibid.
[146] At the luncheon of the Lord Mayor of London on November 10, 1941, the Prime Minister Churchill stated that Great Britain would declare war on Japan immediately if war broke out between the United States and Japan, New York Times, November 11, 1941, 1:1, 2. The Japanese press replied to Prime Minister Churchill's speech by saying it was "an outrageous but crafty British plot to involve the United States in a war in the Pacific for the protection of British interests."
32
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
understood for the first time how critical the situation actually was. Ambassador Craigie promised to report the details of his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister to the British government immediately. When reporting this conversation to Ambassador Nomura on November 11, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that the United States government still considered the negotiations in the preliminary stage, and it was necessary that Ambassador Nomura correct this opinion. [147]
43. Ambassador Nomura Seeks Clarification of Tripartite Pact Issues
On November 11, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent a message to the Japanese Foreign Office requesting clarification of certain details involving the Tripartite Pact. Ambassador Nomura asked whether Foreign Minister Togo in his conversation with Ambassador Grew has emphasized the point that the Japanese government assumed the United States agreed with Japan's definition of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as set forth in the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941. Actually, however, Ambassador Nomura reminded the Foreign Minister that the United States' oral statement of October 2, 1941 indicated that America did not agree with this Japanese interpretation. During Minister Wakasugi's conversations with Under Secretary of States Welles it was merely noted that "the United States also gave indications that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility." Although both the United States and Japanese representatives were exchanging notes in spite of the fact that no definite decision had been made with regard to the Tripartite Pact issues, Ambassador Nomura wished these various points cleared up in order that no misunderstanding might arise from them. [148]
44. The Chinese Ambassador Confers with President Roosevelt
Ambassador Nomura reported on November 11, 1941 that the Chinese Ambassador to the United States had called on President Roosevelt on the previous day. Since the interview had lasted only two minutes, the purpose of the Chinese Ambassador's visit was probably to hand the American President a written document. Although unable to determine the contents of this document, Ambassador Nomura had passed on the scant information he had obtained to his government hoping that it might be of some value to them. [149]
45. Mr. Kase Calls on Ambassador Grew (November 12, 1941)
At the request of Foreign Minister Togo, Mr. Kase called on Ambassador Grew on Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire November 12, 1941. [150] Mr. Kase explained to Ambassador Grew that although Mr. Togo could not speak with complete freedom on certain subjects to the American representative, he nevertheless desired to give the United States a complete understanding of how the present situation affected the Japanese government. From the latest reports of Ambassador Nomura's conversations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, Mr. Togo was deeply concerned about America's inadequate appreciation of the urgency of the situation.
Since the Japanese government had made the greatest possible concessions to the United States, Foreign Minister Togo considered official negotiations between Japan and the United States to be in their final stage. When Prime Minister Konoye's government had been in power, it had conducted the conversations with the support of the entire country but since no tangible progress had been made, Japanese public opinion regarded the United States' delay as a means of concealing preparations underway for the complete encirclement of Japan. Therefore, the present Japanese Cabinet had undertaken the task of reaching an agreement with the United States against much opposition and if any appreciable delay were encoun‑
[147] IV, 82.
[148] IV, 83.
[149] IV, 84.
[150] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" November 12, 1941, S.D. II, 719‑722.
33
tered, a very critical state of affairs would result. Not only would Mr. Togo's official position be imperiled, but his very life would be at stake. Nevertheless, Mr. Kase added that Foreign Minister Togo had the courage to continue his attempts for the re‑establishment of friendly relations between Japan and the United States fully aware of the consequences of failure.
Ambassador Grew remarked that Mr. Kase's observations were generally the same as those expressed by former Foreign Minister Toyoda and Prime Minister Konoye during former conversations. Mr. Kase insisted that there was considerable difference between the present situation and the previous one and again he emphasized the vital importance of concluding present negotiations successfully. [151]
At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Grew read Secretary Hull's report of the interview with Ambassador Nomura on November 7, 1941.15 After reading the report, Mr. Kase stated that Ambassador Nomura's details on the conversation were very similar.
Mr. Kase said that Foreign Minister Toyoda was especially interested in Secretary Hull's suggestion that the Chinese government might be willing to express a desire to seek peaceful cooperation with Japan. Since that suggestion was generally linked with the whole adjustment of the Pacific problem, Ambassador Grew felt that it would come under the cognizance of Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.
Next, Mr. Kase inquired whether Ambassador Grew had received an account of the conversation between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura held on November 10, 1941. Replying that there was probably little difference between that conversation and the one between the Japanese Ambassador and Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941, Ambassador Grew said that the American State Department had failed to send him that report as yet. Mr. Kase said that the conversations were entirely different in tone.
Ambassador Grew then handed Mr. Kase a copy of his report dealing with the interview with Foreign Minister Togo on November 10, 1941. After reading it over, Mr. Kase stated that the report was inaccurate in one sense since Mr. Togo had never stated that "he did not wish to press the point" regarding the transference of the informal conversations into "official negotiations". Although he did not contradict Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew, in his report to the American State Department, pointed out that Counselor Dooman's notes taken during the conversation, revealed that Mr. Togo had actually made such a statement in Japanese. [153]
From this conversation with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew (in his personal comments forwarded to the State Department) noted that considerable doubt had been cast on the alleged message received from Foreign Minister Togo through the prominent Japanese informant on November 7, 1941. [154] In this message Foreign Minister Togo had supposedly said that although he could not express himself with unrestrained freedom, he nevertheless, wished to make a suggestion. He said that the Tojo government had decided upon the maximum concessions that it would be willing to make in order to meet the desires of the United States. However, even if these concessions were regarded as inadequate by the United States, the Japanese government believed that the Washington conferences should continue. [155] However, after talking with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew was convinced that the message received through the Japanese informant was misleading. Even at the time of its delivery, Ambassador Grew had been somewhat surprised at its contents, yet he had no grounds on which to question its accuracy. Although it appeared obvious even now that the Japanese government would prefer a continuation of the informal conversations to a complete breakdown of negotiations, nevertheless, Ambassador Grew appreciated the dangerous situation which would result if these
[151] Ibid.
[152] See "Memorandum of a Conversation"‑November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 706‑709.
[153] S.D. 11, 719‑722.
[154] "Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)"‑November 12, 1941, S.D. II, 722.
[155] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)"‑November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 705.
34
conversations dragged on and produced no definite progress. While realizing that Japan must take the initiative in these conversations, Ambassador Grew did not feel authorized to say whether the Japanese proposals of November 7, 1941 constituted the maximum number of concessions that it would be willing to make. [156]
46. Ambassador Nomura Seeks English Translation of Proposal B
In view of the fact that Japanese‑American relations had not progressed as a result of the Japanese proposals, it was evident that Ambassador Nomura would have to present the United States government with the alternate proposal B. In order that there might be no misunderstanding arising with the presentation of this proposal, Ambassador Nomura requested that Tokyo send him an English translation of this proposal immediately. [157]
47. Japanese Official Analyzes Roosevelt's Domestic and Foreign Strategy
On November 12, 1941 a Japanese intelligence official in Washington sent Tokyo a report on the Roosevelt administration's method of dealing with the Japanese‑American situation. [158] In an effort to aid in the defeat of Germany President Roosevelt had inaugurated military, economic, and industrial measures which would eventually lead America into complete war. By assisting Great Britain it had already entered the conflict on the high seas. While the United States army was not yet equipped to fight a war with Germany on land, for the present, at least, the United States navy could engage German warships on the high seas. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that President Roosevelt had almost dictatorial powers in regard to Congress and the military officials, the American people were not in complete sympathy with his policies. For example, on November 10, 1941 the Times Herald had stated that Roosevelt was as much a dictator as Hitler or Stalin. Furthermore, the America First Committee was secretly working to impeach President Roosevelt. On October 30, 1941 at Madison Square Garden 8,000 members of the America First Committee gathered as a demonstration against the foreign policies of the present United States government. [158a]
In Washington a former American Ambassador demanded that President Roosevelt be forced to resign his position as President by means of a referendum. He even went so far as to state that President Roosevelt might easily die during this disastrous period in the nation's history. This statement drew great applause from the audience. Apparently, the Japanese intelligence official went on to say, the move to impeach President Roosevelt was wide‑spread and was initiated by many varying factions. An editorial in the Times Herald on November 4, 1941 warned that it would be impossible for Congress to impeach President Roosevelt because of the whip he held over the army and navy. Nevertheless, the editorial in this and other papers did mention the possibility of President Roosevelt's being impeached at some time, and the Japanese intelligence official believed this to be extremely significant.
As an indication that the American people were not entirely behind President Roosevelt's aid to Britain, the Japanese official cited the occurrence in Detroit when Ambassador Halifax was pelted with eggs. The American public as a whole had begun to view the prospect of war in its unprecedented aspects and after the sinking of the Reuben James the country received a great shock. Although President Roosevelt took advantage of this sinking to declare an unlimited national emergency, in his speech on October 27, 1941 he did not stress foreign questions but placed his emphasis almost entirely upon America's internal problems. [159]
[156] S.D. II, 722.
[157] IV, 85.
[158] IV, 86.
[158a] Ibid.
[159] IV, 87, DoD comment, name withheld.
35
During the past few months even the attitude of Congress toward Roosevelt had been affected by public opinion. In spite of the fact that the Senate had approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into war zones, the actual victory was only by the small margin of fifty to thirty‑seven. It was obvious then, that the people of the United States feared the German war machine. In general the American people believed that the Japanese were exhausted from their four years of war with China, and that, if war took place between Japan and the United States, Japan would quickly be defeated. If war were declared upon Japan, President Roosevelt could declare an unlimited emergency, disperse the America First Committee, and crush all opposition to his administration. The Japanese official believed that in time, president Roosevelt, using the Japanese as a tool, could even prepare the American people for a war with Germany, Japan's ally.
Viewed from any aspect a Japanese‑American war, according to the Japanese intelligence official, would be disastrous to Japan. Germany at the present time was anxious to conclude peace with England and should American aid to the British be slowed down Germany might possibly be able to accomplish this plan. It was doubtful whether Germany would let Japan stand in its way if the end of the war were in sight. [160]
In warning his government of the dangers of a war with the United States the Japanese intelligence official pointed out still further that the present Japanese‑American relations were heading both countries toward armed conflict. In view of that fact the Japanese official suggested that his government devise some temporary understanding with the United States in order to alleviate the economic pressure upon the Japanese people and to allow conditions in the Pacific to return to some semblance of normalcy. Reminding his government that President Roosevelt had taken an active interest in the European war when Germany invaded the Netherlands, the Japanese official pointed out that President Roosevelt would inevitably enter the war against the Nazis and would declare war on the German government rather than the Japanese. Japan could then hope to obtain a complete and satisfactory agreement with the American government. [161]
48. Japanese Naval Activity Seen in the Mandates
In spite of the warnings of Japanese officials in the United States to curtail operations in the Pacific that might lead to war with America, the Japanese government continued preparations for future aggression.
On November 12, 1941 American traffic analysts disclosed that during the month of October new call signs had appeared in Mandate traffic indicating a decided increase in Japanese forces there. In fact, the Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit and Saipan were being included in dispatches which would not affect them under ordinary circumstances. Apparently several new units were even being added to the Sixth Base Force in the Jaluit area. [162]
49. Hull‑Nomura Conversation (November 12, 1941)
a. State Department's Report [163]
Since he had made an appointment on November 10, 1941 for another conversation with Mr. Hull, Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, called at the apartment of the American Secretary of State on November 12, 1941. Before beginning the conversation, Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a statement which he had prepared in response
[160] IV, 88.
[161] IV, 89.
[162] IV, 90.
[163] "Memorandum of a Conversation"‑November 12, 1941. S.D. II, 722‑726, Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine.
36
to a request from Minister Wakasugi for a further elaboration of Secretary Hull's views on the development of a true friendship between Japan and China. [164]
In Secretary Hull's oral statement reference was made to Ambassador Nomura's request for an amplification of the suggestion made on November 7, 1941 for the mutual exchange of pledges of cooperation between Japan and China. [165] Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese representatives that he had made this suggestion after Ambassador Nomura had pointed out that if Japanese troops were removed from all areas of China, the Japanese people would have no tangible gains from their four years of heavy sacrifice. Since Europe was threatened with anarchy, Secretary Hull believed that Japan held in its power the unique opportunity for enhancing its national prestige by moral force. If the Chinese government were able to cooperate with Japan along peaceful and beneficial lines and Japan found it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual conciliation, the Japanese government would be making a contribution toward arresting the destructive forces that now menaced civilization. [166] In this way Japan would assume leadership in a peaceful world.
What Secretary Hull envisioned in his suggestion was the practical application of basic principles directed toward the preservation of social and economic order by means of which all nations of the world would be able to collaborate peacefully, unthreatened by aggrandizement or discrimination of any kind. Such a policy would provide for liberalization of trade while, at the same time, affording access to, and development of, natural resources for the benefit of all peoples. At this critical moment in world history, the adoption of such a plan by the Japanese government would be attributed to its far‑sighted statesmanship. [167]
After reading Ambassador Nomura this oral statement, Secretary Hull then said that in order to avoid any misunderstanding with regard to the concessions already agreed upon by the Japanese government, and in order to ascertain whether the new Japanese Ministry was willing to retain the former proposals, he had drawn up a statement on this subject. In this second oral statement handed to Ambassador Nomura concerned with the former Japanese concessions, the United States government reminded Japan that the documents handed to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 by Ambassador Nomura asserted that "Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world . . . . ." Because of this attitude the Japanese government at that time thanked the United States for the invitation to conduct negotiations with the goal of establishing a workable understanding. In order to attain a united effort toward the peaceful settlement of the entire Pacific situation, the Japanese government stated that it was willing to make certain sacrifices. Denying any intention of threatening other countries by the stationing of its troops in Indo-China, the Japanese government stated that it "is prepared to withdraw its troops from French Indo‑China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia". This same pledge of its peaceful intentions was made applicable to Thailand at the same time. [168]
In this document Japan made specific reference to the Soviet Union by declaring that as long as Russia remained faithful to the Soviet‑Japanese Neutrality Treaty by menacing neither Japan or Manchukuo, the Japanese government would maintain friendly relations
[164] Ibid.
[165] "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)"‑November 12, 1941, S.D. II, 726‑727. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura and decoded by American cryptanalysts see IV, 97‑99.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] "Oral Statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)"‑November 12, 1941, S.D. II 727‑729. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura and decoded by American cryptanalysts see IV, 93‑96.
37
with that country. "In a word, the Japanese government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation." Since Japan was in accordance with the practical application of the principles set forth by the United States government, it had insisted that it desired to continue the informal discussions in order to work out a progressive program by peaceful methods.
Since a new Cabinet had come into office in Japan, the United States government asked assurance that the position of the Japanese government had not changed in regard to the matters stated. When the United States had handed its last document to Japan on October 2, 1941, it had pointed out the difficulty in understanding Japan's apparent need for qualifying certain statements of policy. The United States government had in mind such phrases as:
"As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet‑Japanese Neutrality Treaty and does not menace Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty‑"
"Without provocation‑"
"Without any justifiable reason‑"
In answer, Minister Wakasugi on October 13, 1941, had stated that those qualifications were the result of unfortunate phraseology and the Japanese government was willing to omit them. The United States government asked whether the new Japanese Cabinet confirmed Minister Wakasugi's statement.
In attempting to avoid any misunderstanding, Secretary Hull pointed out that the United States government had not directed any of the foregoing observations at the new proposals submitted by Ambassador Nomura on November 7 and November 10, 1941. The United States government also assured Japan that it had no desire to delay negotiations and that it would expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese government. [169]
After receiving these documents, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that the Japanese government wished to expedite the settlement of any problems with the United States before the impending session of the Japanese Diet because further delay would increase the difficult internal situation in Japan. He requested that some agreement be reached within a week or ten days. Assuring the Japanese Ambassador that the United States government was working as rapidly as possible to reach a decision on the Japanese proposals handed to President Roosevelt on November 10, 1941, Secretary Hull commented that some discussion with the Chinese government might be had as soon as a good basis in the exploratory conversations were reached. At the same time, however, certain of Japan's points regarding commercial policies had not been clarified sufficiently. Secretary Hull asked if the Japanese government intended to have Great Britain and other countries come to some sort of an agreement on commercial equality.
Next, Secretary Hull referred to the difficulty arising from Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Replying that Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact were limited, Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull that Great Britain had remained neutral in the war between Japan and Russia despite the existing Anglo‑Japanese alliance. Even if the United States were to understand the attitude of the present Japanese Cabinet toward the Axis Powers, however, Secretary Hull remarked, there was always the possibility of another government's coming into power in Japan. In view of this possibility and in consideration of the growing distress of conquered European peoples, Secretary Hull declared that it was necessary to prepare for a postwar program, one in which Japan should play a constructive part by uniting with peaceful forces in opposition to Hitler in order to avert further disaster. Ambassador Nomura insisted that as time went on Japan would be less affected by Axis ties just as the Anglo‑Japanese alliance had died after the conclusion of the Russo‑Japanese War. If the proposed agreements were put to a practical application, Ambassador Nomura felt that Japan would not be forced to gain access to materials and markets by aggressive means. Secretary
[169] Ibid.
38
Hull agreed that the Tripartite Pact would not be a problem; that Japan and the United States could work out their agreement along other lines. [169a]
In speaking of the Japanese‑Chinese situation, Secretary Hull, in reply to Ambassador Nomura's question about the United States intercession in the matter, stated that when matters got beyond an exploratory stage, the United States would wish to talk over the subject with the Chinese, British and Dutch and then re‑discuss the matter with Japan. Commenting on the two documents handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull which both Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi had just read, the Japanese Minister asked whether the United States would bring Japan and China together for a mutual exchange of peaceful pledges. Not wishing to commit himself, Secretary Hull said that the main problem was to dispose of basic matters relating to the provisions for a peace settlement; the questions of procedure could be easily settled. Because of some preconception that Secretary Hull's suggestion about a Japanese‑Chinese peace contained more than appeared at first glance, the Japanese representatives kept going over these points during the conversation.
Taking up the Japanese concessions discussed in the second document of the United States government, Minister Wakasugi pointed out that America referred to the Japanese statement of August 28, 1941. The Japanese government wished to use its document of September 25, 1941 as a basis for any discussions. In an attempt to clarify an obvious misunderstanding on the part of the United States government, Minister Wakasugi stated that in the conversation with Under Secretary of State Welles, referred to in the United States' document, he had been alluding to phrases used in the proposals of September 25, 1941. In doing so, he had merely stated that there might have been some unfortunate phraseology in translation which could be improved after comparison with the original Japanese text. Secretary Hull thanked the Japanese Minister for calling his attention to this misunderstanding. [169b]
By way of answering Ambassador Nomura's question regarding the continuation of United States aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek during Japanese‑Chinese peace negotiations, Secretary Hull stated that ways would be found for safeguarding the rights of all countries concerned by some agreement. Secretary Hull did not agree with Ambassador Nomura that the negotiations for peace would drag on for an interminable period. However, Ambassador Nomura commented that if an agreement between Japan and the United States failed on the question of Japan's retention of troops in China, then the Chinese government would hold the key to future relations between Japan and the United States and this might eventually result in war. Whether the United States interceded in the Chinese Affair or not, Secretary Hull insisted, the settlement would naturally be in harmony with the proposed Pacific settlement as a whole. At the same time, however, he took the opportunity to point out to the Japanese representatives that their retention of troops in China was inconsistent with one of the basic principles, namely interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Although he did not offer anything definite on this point, Ambassador Nomura disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan to retain its troops in China permanently.
As the conversation drew to a close, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi that the United States government was giving careful consideration to the latest Japanese proposals and it was hoped that some definite statement could be made concerning them on November 14, 1941. [170]
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report [171]
After his conversation with President Roosevelt on November 10, 1941, Ambassador Nomura had made an appointment to discuss the Pacific problems with Secretary Hull. Although
[169a] S.D. II, 722‑726.
[169b] Ibid.
[170] Ibid.
[171] IV, 91.
39
November 11, 1941 was the Armistice holiday Secretary Hull promised to study the Japanese proposal with other American representatives and discuss the results of this conversation with Ambassador Nomura on November 12, 1941.
At 3:00 p.m. on November 12, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi met with Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine. [172] As a reply to the Japanese counter proposals Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura two oral statements. [173] Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura ascertain the attitude of the new Japanese Cabinet toward each of these statements. Since the second of these oral statements concerned a proposal for peace between Japan and China, the representatives of both countries discussed the China affair in detail. Although a more definite proposal would not be forthcoming from the American government for two days Secretary Hull stated that if the basic principles applied to the Pacific, such as non‑discrimination in commerce, could be similarly applied to China, a complete settlement of Far Eastern affairs could be effected. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that if the Chinese question continued to play a key role in Japanese‑American negotiations, the desired understanding would be delayed. Secretary Hull merely replied vaguely that if the general Pacific principles were applied to China as well as to the other countries of the Far Eastern Pacific an immediate understanding would be possible. After speaking with representatives of England and the Netherlands, Secretary Hull had come to the conclusion that those two governments might sign an agreement with Japan similar to that worked out between Japan and the United States. However, Secretary Hull stated that he had not yet spoken to the Chinese representatives about this matter. [174] At this point in the conversation Mr. Ballantine pointed out that it had been stated in the American proposal of June 21, 1941, that the United States would not allow Japan to inflict upon other countries conditions conflicting with America's basic principles. Anxious to get more definite details regarding Secretary Hull's proposal for Japanese-Chinese peace Minister Wakasugi asked whether the United States intended to secure a peace guarantee from China and then transmit it to Japan, or whether the three countries would meet together in a conference. Minister Wakasugi also wished to know at what stage in the Japanese‑American negotiations the United States would secure this peace pledge from China. To all these questions Secretary Hull avoided giving a definite reply. However, he intimated his intention to mediate between Japan and China in order . to obtain the desired peace. Furthermore, the American Secretary of State appeared confident that once Japanese-American negotiations were in their final stages the problem regarding Japanese‑Chinese peace could be settled without any difficulty. [175]
In an attempt to make the American representative understand Japan's position in regard to the stationing of troops in China, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that under his government's new proposal the troops would be removed within a specified time. Although Secretary Hull replied that the stationing of Japanese troops in China constituted interference in the affairs of other nations; nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with Ambassador Nomura's explanation on this point.
The conversation then turned to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull stated frankly that his government did not understand why Japan persisted in regarding the Tripartite Pact as a defensive measure when Hitler was carrying out a brutal offensive against the small nations of Europe. Once the European war was over, Secretary Hull said, the United States would have to take charge of the people throughout that hemisphere. If some understanding could be worked out now between Japan and the United States and a similar one between Japan, England and the Netherlands, the stability of the Pacific would
[172] IV, 92.
[173] S.D. II, 727‑729; IV, 93‑99.
[174] IV, 92. See IV, 84 which reports an interview between the Chinese Ambassador and President Roosevelt.
[175] IV, 100.
40
be insured, and Japan would be given an opportunity to cooperate in the establishment of the European peace. Minister Wakasugi denied that the Tripartite Pact constituted a threat to any peace plan. In proving his point he reminded Secretary Hull that the Japanese‑British alliance was in effect throughout the Russo‑Japanese War and was later nullified at the Washington conference. Minister Wakasugi insisted that the situation changed with the circumstances. [176] Furthermore, Minister Wakasugi said, Japan would not be forced to adopt aggressive policies if it could secure petroleum and other necessary raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands East Indies by normal trade measures. Since the Japanese government actually wished to apply the nondiscriminatory policy to all its commercial transactions, Minister Wakasugi believed that the United States would be willing to adopt Japan's latest proposals. In reply Secretary Hull agreed that the situation was extremely critical at this time. Nevertheless, he maintained that the problems which had accumulated over a period of ten years could not be settled over night. Minister Wakasugi reminded Secretary Hull that some agreement should be reached before the Japanese Diet convened in Tokyo on November 25, 1941.
As a result of the discussion Ambassador Nomura concluded that the United States was continuing to study the three major problems existing between its government and Japan as well as the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941. Since Ambassador Nomura was not satisfied with the American attitude toward the conversations, however, he instructed Minister Wakasugi to confer with Secretary Hull and reemphasize the need for an immediate decision. [177]
50. Ambassador Kurusu Reports on American Pessimism
While en route to the United States by clipper, Ambassador Kurusu reported meeting Mr. Hozuituk, a member of the Cooper party, who had recently gone on a Far Eastern tour. While conversing with this man Ambassador Kurusu learned that the Cooper party felt Ambassador Kurusu's mission was a lost cause since Japanese‑American negotiations would never culminate in a successful peace settlement. In reporting this attitude to Tokyo on November 13, 1941, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether the American public was influenced in any way by the pessimistic point of view of the Cooper party. Ambassador Kurusu felt that it might be of some value to learn the actual influence that this party had in the United States. [178]
51. Japan Revises Text of Proposal B
On November 13, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura instructions for changing certain phrases in Proposal B. In its revised form Section I of the addendum was to read: "As required upon having a joint agreement assuredly established between Japan and China or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops dispatched to French Indo‑China at present. [179]
52. Foreign Minister Togo Questions American Interpretation of Proposals
On November 13, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo sent Ambassador Nomura a message questioning America's interpretation of certain phases of the Japanese proposals. [180] For example, Foreign Minister Togo stated that Ambassador Grew had shown him a digest of the Japanese Ambassador's conversation with Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941. In Ambassador Grew's report Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura directly for a "concrete statement of Japan's
[176] IV, 101.
[177] IV, 102.
[178] IV, 103.
[179] IV, 104, 29. (Note that the English translation of this section of the Proposal B mentioned in 104 differs from that found in 29. )
[180] IV, 105.
41
relations with the Axis powers." Since Ambassador Nomura had made no mention of this phrase in his message to Tokyo regarding the conversation with Secretary Hull, Foreign Minister Togo asked for a more complete report on it. From the attitude of the United States toward the present negotiations it was apparent that the American government still thought of the conversations as being in their preliminary stages. On November 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo stated that he had mentioned this to Ambassador Grew, warning him that the seriousness of the situation forced both countries to consider these negotiations as final. Foreign Minister Togo asked Ambassador Nomura to press Secretary Hull with this point. The Japanese Foreign Minister warned Ambassador Nomura that Ambassador Grew had shown him the report of the Hull‑Nomura conversations only through his own personal courtesy, therefore he warned Ambassador Nomura not to make any mention of it to American representatives in Washington. [181] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
53. Finance Official Nishiyama to Study Japanese‑American Negotiations
Possibly because of the effect of American economic and commercial results upon Japan, on November 12, 1941, Finance Official Nishiyama was ordered to study all matters relating to the Japanese‑American negotiations. Mr. Okinobu Kikaya, the Japanese Finance Minister, evidently convinced that these negotiations were the focal point of the recent international situation was to confirm his instructions to Mr. Nishiyama in a later message. [182]